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I. INTRODUCTION
"ITihere is a link between the insulation of institutional arrangements
from challenge and revision and their power to generate and support rigid
hierarchies of power and advantage. "1
Among commentators criticism of mandatory binding arbitration of
individual employment rights has focused on whether contract doctrine has
been properly applied2 and whether nonunion, mandatory binding
arbitration clauses violate the constitutional rights of employees. 3 This Note
focuses on the contractual side of the debate. It employs a deconstructionist
1 ROBERTO MANGABEU1A UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYsIs BECOME? 168-
169 (1996).
2 See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights: Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 1017
(1996) (arguing that many prehire arbitral agreements are blatant contracts of adhesion
that operate much like early nineteenth-century contracts in which employees had to
promise not to join a union in order to be hired). But see Kenneth R. Davis, When
Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BuFF.
L. REV. 49, 85 (1997) (arguing that, although arbitration awards that violate public
policy may harm third parties, the benefits of arbitration outweigh the dangers). See
generally Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L.
REv. 1131 (1995) (discussing the trend of the 1980s and 1990s away from a
"functionalist" approach to contract law that emphasizes flexible, narrow-issue thinking
and substantive fairness toward an approach relying on formal, abstract categorization
of contract disputes).
3 State action is of course a prerequisite for determining that mandatory binding
arbitration agreements are unconstitutional. For an analysis suggesting that, among
other factors, the Supreme Court's preference for arbitration over litigation raises the
Court's enforcement of mandatory binding arbitration agreements to the level of state
action, see Richard C. Rueben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577 (1997). For an analysis of the
constitutionality of binding arbitration agreements suggesting that many are
unconstitutional because they deprive prospective litigants of their right to a jury and an
Article III judge, and deny them due process rights to adequate notice, an impartial
judge, a meaningful appeal, and other procedural protections, see Jean R. Sternlight,
Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding
Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process
Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1997).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
critique of contract doctrine to suggest that a jurisprudence, like that
evolving around agreements to arbitrate statutory employment claims,
which limits itself to application of contract defenses (e.g., duress or
unconscionability), will give short shrift to important normative issues that
decisionmakers must decide in order to resolve arbitration agreement
disputes. 4 Because contract defenses such as duress and unconscionability
are largely indeterminate, courts must ultimately rely upon their
interpretations of public norms in order to reach their conclusions rather
than simply enforcing the fully consensual and thus politically neutral
assent of the parties.
Contract doctrine disguises this public, nonconsensual, and nonneutral
decisionmaking of courts by suggesting that it either relies on the private
intentions of the parties to the exclusion of other public policy concerns or
that contract doctrine has determinate and neutral ways of deciding when
public concerns should intrude into private bargains. The primary
contention of this Note is that this unspoken normative decisionmaking, this
political determination of what levels and types of inequality the courts
should tolerate, should be at the forefront of the debate rather than being
subject to contract doctrine's sleight-of-hand.
After demonstrating how the contract defenses of duress and
unconscionability place a veneer of formalistic legitimacy over inherently
political decisionmaking, this Note will examine the Supreme Court's
contractual approach to agreements to arbitrate statutory employment rights
as set out in the controversial Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.5
decision. This Note will suggest that the Court's application of contract
doctrine disguised and falsely justified a public, normative choice by
reducing the discussion of the issue to the terse statement that there was
"no indication ... that Gilmer, an experienced businessman, was coerced
or defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause." 6
This Note will conclude by suggesting that the implicit political or
normative choices that contract doctrine both forced upon the Court and
that prevented the Court from openly discussing in its Gilmer decision were
supplemented by the Court's explicit application of an arbitrary political
preference for arbitration over litigation. 7 The Judiciary has created this
4 For an introduction to critical approaches to contract doctrine, see Jay M.
Feinman & Peter Gabel, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE PoLrrcs oF LAW: A
PRoGRESsIvE CRmQUE 497 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
5 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
6 Id. at33.
7 See discussion infra Part III.B.
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preference despite the Legislature's clearly expressed policy determination
that inequality of bargaining power concerns required that the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA)8 not apply to employment contracts. 9 Nevertheless,
the Gilmer decision employs the judicially manufactured preference for
arbitration in deciding to enforce an arbitration clause that in practical
terms governed the employment relationship. 10
The Court's approach does not explain the basis of the normative
decisions inherent in contract doctrine's definition of defenses based on
inequality of bargaining power. 11 Nor does its approach require the Court
to expend significant effort in justifying its refusal to uphold contract
defenses based on those theories in particular cases. As if all of this
submerged normative decisionmaking were not enough, the Supreme Court
has begun to construct a thin facade of circular reasoning to defend the
preference for arbitration over litigation-a preference which should not
require any husbanding from the bench as it is supposedly drawn directly
from Congress's FAA. 12
Given this evasive approach, it appears that the heart of the
decisionmaking-the public, normative determinations as to when and why
society should intervene in agreements to arbitrate-will remain cloaked in
the obfuscation of contract doctrine and the arbitrariness of the preference
for arbitration.
II. DURESS AND UNCONSCIONABILITY
A. The Problems of Power and Knowledge
Clare Dalton has identified two basic problems that render the contract
defenses of duress and unconscionability largely indeterminate: the
problems of power and knowledge. 13 The problem of power is that "[w]e
8 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994).
9 See discussion infra Part llI.B. For a more thorough dismantling of the
legitimacy of the Court's preference for arbitration over litigation, see Jean R.
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996).
10 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25.
11 See id. at 33.
12 See id. at 25.
13 See Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94
YALE L.J. 997, 1024-1039 (1985). Professor Dalton's essay is truly a tour deforce and
a must-read for anyone interested in critical approaches to contract doctrine.
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live with two convictions-that we should take care of ourselves and that
we should take care of others-and we lack any conceptual or instrumental
scheme sufficiently persuasive in its neutrality or its appeal to consensual
values to regulate when one impulse should predominate."14 Put another
way, when a decisionmaker must decide when and why to overturn the
expressed intent of contracting parties based upon public norms (e.g.,
fundamental fairness or honesty), the decision is inevitably nonneutral.
The problem of knowledge is that we cannot directly know what the
parties to a contract intended. 15 Instead we must turn to factors other than
the parties' intent in an attempt to infer their intent, such as whether the
weaker party could have resisted particular threats or whether the bargain is
so unequal that no one who was not coerced would have agreed to it. But
this attempt runs squarely into the problem of power. 16 Once one must rely
on factors external to the intent of the parties, one is merely trying to
decide whether a particular set of factual circumstances warrants an
inference that public norms have been violated. This is exactly the kind of
political decision that contract doctrine purports to avoid by relying on the
intent of the parties.
B. The Realist Approach
Before the realist critique surfaced, classical contract doctrine operated
according to a paradigm that asserted that contractual obligation was
absolutely private and apolitical because it was based on the assent of
privately contracting parties. 17 Its conception of duress was highly formal,
recognizing as coercion only threats of physical harm or otherwise illegal
acts. 18 The realist critique of contract doctrine led to a softening of the rigid
formalism of earlier contract law and paved the way for an approach that
placed a greater emphasis on flexible, narrow-issue thinking and
substantive fairness. 19 The concept of unconscionability, relying as it does
on a more explicit recognition of the role of public norms in overturning
contracts, would have been logically incompatible with classical doctrine.
The realists recognized that coercion did not have to be physical to
improperly affect the terms of an agreement and that duress doctrine was in
14 Id. at 1025-1026.
15 See id. at 1025.
16 See id.
17 See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
18 See id. at 10-11.
19 See Mooney, supra note 2, at 1132-1133.
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fact an intrusion of public norms of fairness into a contractual dispute
regardless of the parties' expressed intent.20 Some realist critiques of
contract doctrine's treatment of inequality of bargaining power recognized
that every contract is to some extent the result of compulsion because every
contract is the result of some amount of inequality of bargaining power.
Thus, they concluded that every contract implicated public norms. 21
One could have drawn the inference from this early radical approach
that we should abandon the notion that the duress doctrine can be justified
by treating equality of exchange and of bargaining power as indicators that
the weaker party freely assented. Rather, this approach seemed to imply
that our jurisprudence ought to self-consciously confront the questions of
how much inequality of exchange and of bargaining power we are prepared
to accept as a society and design our rule of law around an assessment of
how much inequality we could accept. Perhaps because of the potentially
sweeping implications of such an approach, realists insisted upon treating a
combination of equivalence of exchange and equivalence of bargaining
power as indicators of the reality of assent.22
The difference between the classical and realist conceptions of duress is
that the classical or formalistic approach defined duress as involving
behavior so alarming that the assent must have been "unreal." The realist
approach, on the other hand, understood duress as more of an expression of
public norms of fairness: some bargains are so offensive to our norms of
fairness or honesty that courts should not enforce them. Thus, the realists
were willing to give inequivalence of exchange greater weight in their
duress determination.2 3 The formalist approach "reprivatizes" duress by
20 See, e.g., John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45
MICH. L. REv. 253, 266-267 (1947).
21 See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L.
REv. 603, 612 (1943). "[All money is paid, and all contracts are made, to avert some
kinds of threats." Id.
22 See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 20, at 289. The implications of allowing the
duress doctrine to be invoked simply on the basis of inequality of exchange were more
than Dawson was prepared to confront, and he thus proposed limiting the duress
doctrine to those situations in which inequality of bargaining power was also at work.
See Dalton, supra note 13, at 1030-1031. Thus, he stated that "in the absence of [any]
countervailing factors of policy or administrative feasibility, restitution is required of
any excessive gain that results, in a bargain transaction, from impaired bargaining
power, whether the impairment consists of economic necessity, mental or physical
disability, or a wide disparity in knowledge or experience." Dawson, supra note 20, at
289.
23 See Dalton, supra note 13, at 1030.
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suggesting that looking at factors external to the parties' intent in light of
public norms is in fact simply a method of divining the parties' intent.
The realist approach recognizes that to a certain extent one must
explicitly acknowledge that one is resorting to a public rather than private
source to legitimize the resolution. But it once again encounters the
problem of power when it suggests that one can neutrally and consensually
determine when, and which, public norms should decide the case. 24 The
realist solution to the observation that coercion exists in every bargain was
therefore an attempt to cordon off the public aspects of contract doctrine by
suggesting that it is possible to determine when public concerns should
trump the private assent of the parties without making nonconsensual,
nonneutral decisions. The realists failed to constrain the intrusion of public
norms into contract because they failed to recognize the problem of the
indeterminacy of the parties' intent. They therefore insisted upon retaining
the notion that reliance upon factors external to the parties' intent could be
used to determine their intent.
Specifically, some realists insisted that inequivalence of bargaining
power was an essential element of duress, or simply stated that the duress
determination could be affected by "factors of policy or administrative
concerns." 25 This insistence on including inequivalence of bargaining
power and upon leaving the door open to consider policy and administrative
concerns meant that the realist approach would replicate some of the
mistakes of classical doctrine. Notably, the realist insistence upon including
impaired bargaining power as an element of duress would still require
courts to make determinations of the "reality of assent," despite the fact
that the parties' subjective intent is ultimately unknowable. 26 Critical legal
24 See id.
Although [realists] wanted to make the substance of the bargain a central
feature of duress doctrine, [they were] not prepared to confront directly the theory
of "subjective value" so central to bargain theory. [They] argued that [their]
suggestions did not "involve any expectation that the methods of private litigation
will be used to overhaul the immense range of transactions involving the sale or
exchange of goods and services in a competitive society." . . . At one level, this
acknowledgement of the "public" nature of the assessment [of impaired bargaining
power] repairs the difficulty of subjectively assessing intent; but it implicates the
decisionmaker all over again in the question of what the basis of the decision is to
be.
Id. at 1030-1031 (quoting Dawson, supra note 20, at 290).
25 See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 20, at 289.
26 See Dalton, supra note 13, at 1032 ("The conflict between subjective and
objective value, between individualistic policies premised on inequality and dedicated to
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scholarship has suggested that in order to fully acknowledge the
indeterminacy of intent the realist approach must be taken to its logical
extreme, focusing on "identifying either those public norms that must
invalidate private contracts, or those instances in which private intention
requires the protection provided by public intervention." 27
C. Deconstructing Duress and Unconscionability
The duress and unconscionability defenses have applied three general
approaches to justify intervening in contracts to police the limits of a fair
bargain. 28 First, one might look to the intent of the weaker party to
determine if her assent was "real." Second, one could look to the stronger
party's behavior to determine whether one thinks anyone could resist in the
face of a particular threat. Third, one could look to the terms of the deal to
ask whether anyone would have entered into such a deal without being
coerced.29
The first approach fails to yield determinate results because of the
problem of knowledge. 30 We cannot know the intent of the weaker party
first hand. Thus, one is forced to look at factors external to the intent of the
weaker party in an effort to infer whether assent was real. Examining these
external factors, one inevitably partakes of the other two approaches:
assessing the threat of the stronger party or looking to the terms of the deal.
These approaches run up against the problem of power.31 Because one is
deciding whether the contract is enforceable based upon either acts of the
stronger party or the equivalence of the bargain rather than the intent of the
parties, adjudication is reduced to determining whether the particular bad
acts or inequality of exchange are so incompatible with public norms as to
render the contract unenforceable.
These are normative or political decisions, but contract doctrine
obscures that fact either by "reprivatizing" the decision by portraying it as
a method for determining the "reality" of assent or by suggesting that one
maintaining the basic market structure, and policies designed to minimize advantage
and promote fairness in contractual relationship, can be resolved only by reintroducing
a private analysis of assent.").
27 Id. at 1032.
28 See id. at 1025-1026.
29 See id.
30 See id. at 1025.
31 See id. at 1025-1026.
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can neutrally and consensually distinguish the situations where bad behavior
or inequivalence of exchange requires public intrusion.
Il. THE GILMER DECISION
The Supreme Court addressed agreements of nonunion employees to
arbitrate statutory employment rights in its controversial Gilmer decision. 32
The primary contention of this Note is that the Court's formalistic approach
to such contracts left important normative discussions submerged and failed
to provide guidance as to when and why public norms should trump
arbitration agreements. But the indeterminacy of contract law is not the
only factor that buries normative decisionmaking and renders the decision
analytically unhelpful. Aside from the obfuscation and evasiveness that
contract doctrine foisted upon the Court, the Court's formalistic approach
in fact enabled it to do explicitly what contract law does implicitly: to apply
a public norm without discussing why it was just to do so. Specifically, the
Court's insertion of a preference for arbitration over litigation in the
nonunion employment context represents (barely) submerged normative
decisionmaking that was enabled by a formalistic approach to the definition
of "contract of employment." 33 It was further enabled by a vapid game of
stare decisis leap frog whereby one unjustified decision holding that there
was a preference for arbitration propelled itself over the last in a kind of
perpetual motion driven by no one bothering to figure out why the game
started in the first place. The remainder of this Note will discuss how the
Gilmer decision both implicitly, as a result of its application of contract
doctrine, and explicitly, by applying a preference for arbitration over
litigation, buried important political decisions.
32 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (holding
that statutory employment rights could be the subjects of arbitration agreements
affecting individual employees). Gilmer entered into an arbitration agreement contained
in an Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration application. Gilmer's
employer, Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., required that Gilmer be registered with the
SEC as a securities representative in order to obtain employment. See id. at 23. The
employer terminated Gilmer, and he filed suit for age discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (Supp. 1998). See
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-24.
33 See discussion supra Part II.B.
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A. The Inequality of Bargaining Power Analysis
The Gilmer decision did not clearly indicate whether it was applying
duress or unconscionability doctrine when it decided, in contravention of
legislative intent, 34 that inequality of bargaining did not render arbitration
agreements in the nonunion employment context unenforceable. 35 Though
both approaches are discussed below, the conceptual differences, if there
are any, between "economic duress" and the unconscionability approach to
inequality of bargaining power are ultimately insignificant as both doctrines
are substantially indeterminate.
Duress. doctrine focuses on threats as the basis for invalidating
contracts. 36 The Second Restatement recognizes two kinds of threats: those
that in and of themselves invalidate a contract and those that must also
result in an unfair exchange. 37 The latter category also requires that the
unfair exchange be accompanied by "a use of power for illegitimate
ends." 38 Because the first category focuses on illegal acts and threats to
prosecute or to file civil suits, the Gilmer situation would fall under the
second. But the second approach is rendered indeterminate by the problem
of power. There is no neutral or consensual way to determine when an
exchange is "unfair," or when an exercise of power is "illegitimate."
Whether the exchange was unfair and the use of power was illegitimate is
the very question the court must answer, so that contract doctrine has no
34 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice* Stevens in dissent
quoted a statement made at a hearing of the Senate Subcommittee of the Judiciary:
The trouble [with these things] is that a great many of these [things] entered into
are really not [voluntary] things at all. Take an insurance policy; there is a blank
in it. You can take that or leave it. The agent has no power at all to decide it.
Either you can make that contract or you [cannot] make any contract. It is the
same with a good many contracts of employment. A man says, "These are our
terms. All right, take it or leave it." Well, there is nothing for the man to do
except to sign it; and then he surrenders his right to have his case tried by a court,
and has to have it tried before a tribunal in which he has no confidence at all.
Id. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923) (statement of
Sen. Walsh)).
35 See id. at 30.
36 See RFSTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACrs § 175(a) (1981).
37 See id. §§ 175(a), 176.
38 Id. § 176(c).
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guidance to offer the decisionmaker except the empty notion that the
contract must be fair and legitimate. 39
Unconscionability is similarly plagued by the problem of power.40
Under the Restatement sections most likely to be applied to agreements to
arbitrate employment rights, a contract or provision is unconscionable if
there was grossly unequal bargaining power 4' coupled with "terms
unreasonably favorable to the stronger party" 42 and indications that "the
weaker party had no meaningful choice." 43 These criteria are hopelessly
circular and empty giving one no neutral or consensual scheme by which to
determine what constitutes "gross" as opposed to other forms of inequality,
"unreasonably favorable" terms, or a "meaningful" choice.
Decisionmakers are left to make these decisions solely by applying their
interpretations of public norms to the situations. Thus, the
unconscionability standards merely provide a diversion for the underlying
normative decision of how much inequality renders the contract or
provision invalid.
It is not important which indeterminate doctrine the Gilmer Court
applied, because the discussion surrounding either is not likely to move
forward in determining when public norms require intervention into
contracts and which public norms should be the basis for such intervention.
Rather, the analysis necessarily revolves around empty or circular criteria
such as whether assent was "real" or "meaningful." Such issues are either
unknowable or not resolvable in reference to any neutral and consensual
justifying scheme.
39 See Dalton, supra note 13, at 1035.
40 See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 1001, 1018 (1996).
To declare an arbitration clause, or any contract term, substantively
unconscionable requires a substantive theory of fairness to distinguish conscionable
from unconscionable terms. "A substantive fairness theory assumes that a standard
of value can be found by which the substance of any agreement can be objectively
evaluated. Such a criterion has yet to be articulated and defended." In short,
values are subjective and substantive unconscionability is in the eye of the
beholder.
Id. at 1018 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of
Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 284 (1986)).
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The Gilmer decision predictably partakes of the shortcomings of
contract doctrine in its terse treatment of inequality of bargaining power.
The Court's "analysis" consists of one sentence: "There is no indication in
this case... that Gilmer, an experienced businessman, was coerced or
defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause in his registration
application. "44
This spare treatment can be interpreted in one of two ways. First, one
might infer that the Court is disaffected with the realist insights that led to
the acceptance of economic duress and unconscionability (i.e., that coercion
exists in every contract and that duress can be economic in nature). If so,
the Court's analysis is evidence of the health of what has been described as
"the new conceptualism in contract law," 45 an approach that harkens back
to classical contract doctrine by "emphasiz[ing] definitions, categories, and
syllogistic thought." 46 This could explain why the Court failed to discuss,
in even the obfuscating manner that the duress and unconscionability
doctrines allow, the very concerns about inequality of bargaining power
that prompted Congress to exempt arbitration agreements contained in
certain contracts of employment from coverage under the FAA.47
The second way one might interpret the Court's discussion, or lack
thereof, is to assume that in fact they were relying on factors external to the
inequality of bargaining power (or, to be accurate, one factor: Gilmer's
business experience) to suggest that duress or unconscionability was not a
problem because assent was real or meaningful. Predictably, the Court's
discussion of duress and unconscionability did not explicitly rely upon or
address public norms in reaching its decision. One should not expect it to,
given the foregoing discussion of the circular and diversionary nature of the
duress and unconscionability doctrines. 48
44 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991).
45 Mooney, supra note 2, at 1134.
The most fundamental conception returning to dominate contract law today is
"freedom of contract." That ideological centerpiece of classical contract law
always has appealed powerfully to the hearts and minds of American contract
lawyers. Recently, however, its appeal has increased to pre-1960 levels, as it
becomes once again, in Wittgenstein's phrase, a "picture [holding] us captive."
Id. at 1134-1135 (quoting LuDwIG WrITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
§ 115 (3d ed. 1967)); see also id. at 1135 n.14 ("Other conceptualist examples include
... narrow, definition-dominated treatments of fraud and duress ...
46 Id. at 1134.
47 See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
48 See discussion supra Part II.C.
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To apply that discussion to the Gilmer decision, one need only note that
the Court's emphasis on Gilmer's experience is an effort to infer that
Gilmer's assent was "real." This would allow the Court to justify its
decision by suggesting that it was merely effectuating the intent of the
parties rather than engaging in normative or political decisionmaking.
Because of the problem of the indeterminacy of intent (i.e., the problem of
knowledge) and the problem of power, this effort is futile.
Because the Court cannot know Gilmer's intent first hand, it relies on
other factors to infer Gilmer's intent.49 But Gilmer's level of business
experience does not directly tell us about whether he was actually coerced.
One is simply making the normative or political decision that, at Gilmer's
level of experience, one is willing to infer that he was not coerced while
accepting the risk that he may in fact have been significantly coerced.
Further, the Court made a normative or political decision when it
seized upon business experience as being dispositive of coercion-free
contracting. It is quite possible that even the most experienced of
businesspersons would not, as an individual, have had the bargaining power
to eliminate the arbitration clause. Thus, the Court's exclusive reliance on
Gilmer's experience as the factor that demonstrated that there was no
coercion boils down to the rather crass proposition that anyone who
understands an action that he is taking does so consensually.
This type of normative decisionmaking is exactly what contract doctrine
attempts to eschew by relying on the intent of the parties to justify its
outcomes. Thus, the fact that the Court has not discussed the important
normative question of why the level of coercion present between the parties
does or does not justify public intervention fails to be discussed. Given that
contracts of employment were excluded from coverage under the FAA due
to concern over inequality of bargaining power, 50 the political nature of the
Court's decision that "[m]ere inequality of bargaining power ... is not a
sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable
in the employment context" 51 becomes clear.
49 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
50 See discussion infra Part III.B.
51 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
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B. The Preference for Arbitration
Another way in which disguised political decisionmaking made its way
into the Court's contract analysis of arbitration agreements is through its
preference for arbitration over litigation. 52 Unlike contract doctrine,
however, the preference does not hide its political nature. It makes no
pretense about the fact that it is unadulterated public policy. But unjustified
and unexplained normative decisionmaking was still involved. In 1983, the
Supreme Court decided Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp.53 Without explanation, and citing cases that similarly
did not explain or justify the preference except upon docket clearing
grounds,54 the Court decided that the enforceability of arbitration
agreements would be decided nonneutrally in favor of arbitration. The
Court stated:
[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration. ... The Arbitration Act establishes
that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the
problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability. 5
The Court's assertion that the FAA establishes that disputes should be
resolved in favor of arbitration as a matter of federal law is curious in light
of the text, legislative history, and early Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the Act. The text of the FAA excludes certain contracts of
employment,56 and most commentators have concluded that "the FAA was
envisioned as applying to consensual transactions between two merchants of
roughly equal bargaining power, and not necessarily to transactions
52 See id. at 24 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
53 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
54 See Dickinson v. Heinhold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1981); Wick
v. Atlantic Marine, Inc., 605 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1979); Becker Autoradio U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Becker Auturadiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39, 43-45 (3d Cir. 1978); Hanes
Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (justifying liberal construction
of arbitration agreements by suggesting that they relieve overburdened courts).
55 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25.
56 See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). "[Nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce." Id.
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between a large merchant and a much weaker and less knowledgeable
consumer." 57 Further, the central provision of the FAA merely requires
that agreements to arbitrate be treated like other contracts, not that a
preference should intrude into the contract analysis. 58
The drafters clearly intended that the Act should not apply to employees
and consumers. Justice Stevens, in his Gilmer dissent, quoted the statement
of the chairman of the American Bar Association (ABA) committee
responsible for drafting the Act at a hearing before the Senate
Subcommittee of the Judiciary: "It is purely an act to give the merchants
the right or privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to
what their damages are, if they want to do it. Now that is all there is in
this." 59  Further, early Supreme Court decisions addressing the
enforceability of arbitration agreements not only did not recognize a
preference for arbitration but were in fact protective of consumers and
individual employees. 60
The Court's reversal from its earlier position of concern for equality of
bargaining power to its sudden recognition of a preference for arbitration
was not motivated by any change in the relevant statutory law. 61 Rather,
57 Sternlight, supra note 9, at 647.
58 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
Id. (emphasis added).
59 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 39 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923) (statement of the Chairman of the ABA
Committee)).
60 See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203-205 (1956)
(refusing to force a discharged employee to arbitrate and expressing concern with
protecting an employee from unexpected results); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438
(1953) (discussing that Congress will allow parties to use arbitration if the parties are
"willing to accept less certainty of legally correct adjustment"), overruled on other
grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989).
61 The relevant statute, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994), was not amended after the Wilko
decision.
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the preference for arbitration sprang, fully formed, from the bench.62
Arbitrary as the preference may be, at least one recent Supreme Court
decision insists not only that the preference can be located in the FAA, but
that the preference is the result of natural and inevitable jurisprudence. 63
Reading Justice Breyer defend the preference in First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan64 gives one a Chaplinesque feeling of amused
astonishment at having witnessed someone escape from a situation that in
real life would have been fatal. In that decision, the Court was called upon
to decide whether courts or arbitrators should decide if a dispute is
arbitrable. 65 The Court analyzes the problem by making the blanket
statement that arbitrability is simply a matter of contract and that just as the
arbitrator's power to decide issues on the merits is limited by the arbitration
agreement, so an arbitrator's power to decide arbitrability must be
bestowed upon the arbitrator explicitly in the arbitration agreement. 66
The problem with the Court's attempt to make the neat and clean
argument that an arbitrator's power, as to both arbitrability and merits-
related issues, is all just a matter of contract law is that there are two
conflicting preferences as to how agreements to arbitrate are to be
interpreted. First is the principle that "a party can be forced to arbitrate
only those issues it specifically has agreed to submit to arbitration." 67
Second is the preference for arbitration over litigation which says that
"issues will be deemed arbitrable unless 'it is clear that the arbitration
clause has not included' them." 68
Justice Breyer attempts to justify the preference for interpretation of
arbitration agreements in favor of arbitration by suggesting that people have
given more thought to the matter of what issues they want to arbitrate than
to the matter of who should decide arbitrability. 69 But why should the fact
that one has thoroughly thought through a contract before entering into it
dictate that the contract should be construed nonneutrally in light of a
preference for a particular outcome? While it may be understandable that
62 See Sternlight, supra note 9, at 711.
63 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-943 (1995).
64 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).
65 See id. at 942.
66 See id. at 943.
67 Id. at 945.
68 Id. (quoting 1 THoMAs H. OEHmKE, OEHMKE COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION
§ 12.02 (rev. ed. Supp. 1993)).
69 See id. ("But, [such] treatment is understandable.... In such circumstances,
the parties likely gave [more] thought to the scope of arbitration.").
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because people assume without giving it much thought that disputes they do
not agree to arbitrate will be resolved by a judge, and that those disputes
should thus be decided in light of a preference toward submitting the issue
to a judge, the opposite simply is not true. There is no logical reason why
someone's contract should be construed less neutrally as the amount of
thought that he or she puts into the contract increases.
Having relied on the "thoughtful people deserve to be thrown off
balance by non-neutral interpretation" argument to justify the preference
for arbitration, Justice Breyer's coup de grace is a good old-fashioned
tautology. He states, "given the law's permissive policies in respect to
arbitration ... one can understand why the law would insist upon clarity
before concluding that the parties did not want to arbitrate a related
matter. "70 In other words, because there is a preference for arbitration, it is
understandable that there is a preference for arbitration.
If it was not clear before that the preference had no basis in
jurisprudence, First Options makes it crystal. The preference for arbitration
is an arbitrary finger on the scale that was placed there by the judiciary for
policy reasons. Unfortunately, public policy discussion beyond a few
references to the docket-clearing power of arbitration is entirely lacking
from the case law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Upon examination, the preference for arbitration over litigation turns
out to be just as empty of substance and void of justification as the contract
doctrine that it seeks to influence in favor of arbitration. While the
preference for arbitration is explicitly political, it goes entirely unjustified,
existing merely by judicial fiat-by the sleight-of-hand of citing lower court
cases that are just as lacking in justification as the case itself. Similarly,
contract doctrine requires the exercise of judicial fiat, but of a more
insidious kind. Because the defenses of duress and unconscionability
necessarily rely upon factors external to the intent of the parties, they
necessarily apply public norms to those factors to come to a conclusion.
This amounts to making subjective value judgments, which are not founded
in any neutral or consensual justifying scheme. The resulting decisions are
thus impositions of the power of the state that go without explicit
justification.
Nor does this approach hold out any hope that ongoing dialogue might
mitigate the nonneutral and nonconsensual nature of the decisions that
70 Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
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underlie the duress and the unconscionability doctrines. This is because
decisionmakers that apply the doctrines are constrained by the myth of the
"privateness" of contract doctrine from using and openly discussing public
norms as a source for invalidating contracts. Even when public norms are
allowed to enter into contract doctrine-as with unconscionability
doctrine-the question of when they should be applied runs into the same
problems because it must justify its decision of when to invoke the norm. In
the context of the Gilmer decision, the most important question that the case
presented was not even addressed, and our jurisprudence missed an
opportunity to enrich the dialogue about what level of bargaining power we
are willing to accept in contracts that affect statutory employment rights,
which are themselves the repositories of important public policies.

